How GPS interference is disrupting the Middle East

The screen of a GPS attached to the dashboard of a vehicle as residents of Dubai face GPS disruptions on March 9, 2026, in Dubai. The United Arab Emirates decried that it was being targeted “in a very unwarranted manner” in the war, stressing it would “not partake in any attacks against Iran”, which has lashed out at Gulf countries seen as US allies. (Photo by AFP via Getty Images)

Hours after the first salvos of the U.S. and Israel’s “pre-emptive” strikes against Iran on Feb. 28, the data analytics firm Kpler observed vessels in the Persian Gulf making unusual maneuvers, with location data from ships in the Gulf showing vessels traveling over land and making sharp turns in polygonal paths. Since the start of the war, similar disruptions to location-based services have surged across the Middle East, affecting mariners, aircraft, and motorists alike. These disruptions have also exposed key vulnerabilities of the GPS, an American-made system now synonymous with satellite navigation. For years, firms like Kpler have flagged thousands of instances of oil tankers in the Persian Gulf manipulating onboard Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals — the system used to track vessels in transit — to evade sanctions on Iranian oil exports. Known as spoofing, this manipulation of location signals allows vessels to obscure their movements, and has long been a tool of “covert” operations, according to Ana Subasic, a trade risk analyst from Kpler. But since the start of hostilities in the Middle East, location spoofing in the Persian Gulf has surged dramatically. Within the first 24 hours of the conflict, maritime intelligence firm Windward logged over 1,100 different vessels across the Gulf experiencing AIS interference, followed by a 55% increase a week later.

“There are a lot of entities that are trying to jam GPS — or other satellite navigation signals — in the region with various reasons for doing so,” said Clayton Swope, deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project from the Center for Strategic & International Studies, or CSIS, in an email to CNBC. According to Swope, the added interference with satellite navigation signals across the region likely stems from Gulf states looking to protect against drone and missile strikes on critical infrastructure by “confusing” the onboard navigational systems of adversarial drones and missiles. Such forms of electronic interference are increasingly being deployed as defensive countermeasures in modern warfare — similar disruptions followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, according to a CSIS report. But this interference has also disrupted various aspects of everyday life. Interference has caused aircraft to appear having traveled in erratic, wave-like patterns; on land, malfunctioning GPS systems have also caused food delivery riders to appear off the coast of Dubai. The persistent jamming and spoofing activity in the region also poses key public safety concerns, according to Lisa Dyer, executive director of the GPS Innovation Alliance. Although the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz has significantly reduced shipping activity in the Persian Gulf, foreign-flagged vessels from countries like China and India have still been granted the right of transit. For vessels still carrying crude exports from the Gulf, accurate positioning data is crucial for mitigating risks of collisions or running aground when passing through the narrow Strait, which measures only 21 miles (33 km) at its narrowest, Kpler’s Subasic said. Beyond the navigational challenges for vessels and aircraft in the region, interference with satellite navigation systems could also hamper the responses of emergency services which rely on navigation aids, Dyer said, in a call with CNBC. Despite pervasive interference across the region, Iranian strikes have continued unabated, fueling speculation over the sources of Iran’s military capabilities. “There is evidence, right now, that Iran has been given access to China’s BeiDou,” said Jack Hidary, CEO of navigation technology startup SandboxAQ, referring to China’s global satellite navigation system. “This is giving Iran greater accuracy in its missile strikes and its targeting,” Hidary told CNBC’s Dan Murphy in a televised interview on March 17. Other analysts, cited in publications like Al Jazeera, have also attributed the apparent accuracy of Iranian strikes to its use of China’s BeiDou. Missiles and drones often use a combination of satellite-based navigation systems, and other systems, like inertial navigation capabilities — which operate independent of satellite-based signals — for targeting. Like the GPS — originally a U.S. The development of the BeiDou satellite navigation system by the Department of Defense in Beijing was spurred by concerns over the reliance on the U.S.-made GPS during the 1995 Taiwan Strait Crisis. This perceived over-reliance led to disruptions in GPS signals, allegedly resulting in the loss of ballistic missiles over the Taiwan Strait.

Since its launch in 2000, BeiDou has evolved into its third iteration and has expanded to encompass a wide range of commercial applications. According to Luca Ferrara, general manager of AQNav, BeiDou boasts the largest network compared to other satellite constellations such as GPS, Galileo, and Glonass.

While there has been no official confirmation from Tehran regarding its use of BeiDou, Iran’s deputy communications and information technology minister, Ehsan Chitsaz, reportedly praised the accuracy and architecture of BeiDou following a conflict with Israel last June.

Despite these developments, analysts like Clayton Swope from CSIS believe that Iran’s use of BeiDou may not hold significant implications, as modern satellite navigation chips are capable of receiving signals from multiple global navigation systems.

In light of the vulnerabilities of satellite-based navigation systems exposed during conflicts in the Middle East, industry players are exploring alternative technologies like SandboxAQ’s magnetic field-based navigation system. The emergence of satellite networks like BeiDou and Glonass is seen as a challenge to traditional U.S. strategic dominance in global navigation.

However, the U.S. military is adapting to these challenges with the introduction of a new “jam-resistant” GPS signal, designed to operate in environments with high levels of interference. This upgrade ensures that U.S. forces can continue operations even in the face of persistent electronic interference.

As speculation grows about potential ground invasions and conflicts in the region, the U.S. military’s preparedness with advanced GPS technology could be a crucial advantage.